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Reducing the Necessity for
Scientific Evidence in Natural
Resource Damages Under The
Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act
MATTHEW J. KOES∗
“No witchcraft, no enemy action had silenced the rebirth of
new life in this stricken world. The people had done it
themselves.” –Rachel Carson1
I. INTRODUCTION
The shellfish natural resource provides both economic
and ecological benefits to the coastal regions of the United
States. However, urbanization and industrial activities harm
the fragile coastal eco-system that sustains shellfish.2 This
∗
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Rachel Carson, Silent Spring, 3 (Houghton Miffin, 1962).
2
Randy Lowell, Private Actions and Marine and Water Resources:
Protection, Recovery and Remediation, 8 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 143, 146–47
(2000). “While humankind may still enjoy the right to the oceans and
waterways, mankind's ability to enjoy the oceans and waterways has been
severely hindered in modern times. With the Industrial Revolution and the
staggering rate of increase in human population, industrialization, and
resource consumption, the earth's capacity to sustain this rate has
dwindled, with man having ‘followed an implicit policy of ignoring
uncertain environmental risks until disaster hits.’” Id. (quoting Larry D.
Silver, The Common Law of Environmental Risk and Some Recent
Applications, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 61, 62 (1986)).
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degradation reduces the availability and quality of the
valuable shellfish resource.3 One of the primary culprits
continually contaminating shellfish is the discharge of
hazardous materials into coastal waterways, which ultimately
accumulate in shellfish harvesting areas.4 These discharges
give way to long term economic, ecological and human
health problems.
Plaintiffs who have been harmed by hazardous waste
discharge of this nature have two major avenues for pursuing
a claim against a polluter. First, plaintiffs may rely on
common law tort theories such as: nuisance, trespass,
negligence or strict liability claims.5 More often than not, the
causation element proves to be a major obstacle to the
plaintiff when making a prima facie case. Thus, the claim
may fail.6
The more viable option for recovering natural resource
damages resulting from the discharge of hazardous waste is
to pursue a claim under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (hereinafter
“CERCLA”).7 Since there is much confusion regarding the
parameters of the causation element in natural resource
damage actions,8 CERCLA appears to be the more effective
3

Id. at 147 (“One-fourth of shellfish harvesting areas have been
closed due to contamination”);
See also Council on Environmental Quality, 25th Annual Report 225
(1994), Protecting and Enhancing Shellfish Resources,
http://www.buzzardsbay.org/shellac2.htm. (last visited March 7, 2006).
4
See Table 1-1, Hazards and Risks of Seafood Consumption and
Their Control Arranged According to Importance, in Institute of
Medicine, Seafood Safety 4-5 (Farid E. Ahmed ed., 1991).
5
Julie Mendel, CERCLA Section 107: An Examination of Causation,
40 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 83, 84 (1991); Charles B. Anderson,
Damage to Natural Resources and the Costs of the Restoration, 72 TUL.
L. REV. 417, 420-426 (1997).
6
Mendel, supra note 5.
7
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2002).
8
The D.C. circuit court of appeals has determined that CERCLA is
unclear on the issue of whether the causation standard should be less strict
than that of the common law standard. State of Ohio v, U.S. Dept. of
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vehicle for compensating the public for damages to natural
resources than those offered by traditional common law
principles.
The ultimate manifestations of hazardous waste pollution
are unpredictable and long term.
The cleanup of a
contaminated site may never return that site to its original
condition. Also, the damages recovered in a natural resource
damage action may never fairly compensate the public, who
bears the loss of the natural resources.9 Because of the
speculative nature of the scientific evidence and conflicting
standards used to substantiate such a claim, obtaining results
favorable to both the environment and the public through the
CERCLA process has proven cumbersome.
In the case of shellfish contamination, the coastal
shellfish harvesting areas tend not to be the primary
hazardous waste sites.
Instead, the accumulation of
contamination in the harvesting areas occurs incidentally to
the activities taking place on adjacent waste disposal sites.
Accordingly, gathering evidence of contamination on
adjacent sites and creating the causal link between the release
and the damage is more speculative.
Because the
environmental damage can take years to materialize, the
damage may not be capable of being accurately predicted
until long after the initial contamination to an adjacent site
Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 470-472 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The trial courts have
also reached different conclusions regarding the standard for causation in
natural resource damage actions. See In Re Acushnet River and New
Bedford Harbor, 722 F.Supp. 893, 897 n. 8 (D. Mass 1989) citing O’Neil
v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 179 n 4 (1st Cir. 1989) (the court concluded that
the causation requirement of CERCLA’s section 107(a)(4)(C) could be
met so long as the defendant’s actions were a “contributing factor” to the
injury); see also State of Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F.Supp. 665, 674
(D. Idaho 1986) (the court required a “casual link” between the release of
hazardous substances and the alleged damages).
9
John M. Heyde, Is Contingent Valuation Worth The Trouble?, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 331, 334 (1995)(“[E]ven if a polluter is fully liable for the
cost of restoring a contaminated natural resource, the public is still not
made whole. First, restoration is never immediate, and the public loses
some of the resource’s value for the period between the contamination
and the restoration. Second, some damage can never be repaired.”).
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has occurred. Also, there may be more than one possible
source for the contamination.10
Because of the speculative nature of the scientific
evidence used to substantiate a natural resource damage
claim, its reliability should be called into question and
thoroughly examined.
Evidentiary requirements for
causation in a natural resource action under CERCLA should
be loosened in order to duplicate the quasi strict liability
standards imposed on a plaintiff in a remediation action to
reflect Congress’ intention.11 The imposition of such a
standard will reduce the requirement for the expensive and
impractical gathering of scientific evidence. This would, in
turn, empower the Natural Resource Trustee with the
requisite resources to be more proactive in combating future
pollution. It would also allow the trustee to restore the
damaged natural resource to its baseline condition and give
the trustee the ability to purchase coastal land for
conservation purposes.
II. SOURCES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
SHELLFISH CONTAMINATION
Shellfish are particularly vulnerable to contamination
present in the coastal waterways they occupy.12 The shellfish
(e.g., oysters, clams, scallops) commonly found in the
Northeast, known as “bivalve mollusks,” thrive in shallow

10

Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F.Supp 1269, 1283
(D.Del.1987) (“[I]f the release or threatened release of contaminants from
the Site was a substantial factor in causing [Plaintiffs] to incur costs,
[Defendants] may not escape liability merely because other causes…have
contributed to the result”).
11
Patrick D. Taylor, Liability of Past Owners: Does CERCLA
Incorporate a Causation-Based Standard?, 35 S.TEX.L.REV. 535, 544–45
(1994) (Author argues that Congress intended to implement a strict
liability causation standard in CERCLA natural resource damage actions).
12
Ian Dore, Shellfish: A Guide to Oysters, Mussels, Scallops, Clams
and Similar Products for the Commercial User 15–17 (Van Nostrand
Reinhold ) (1991).
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coastal waters located near freshwater flows.13 Essentially,
they feed by filtering water and extracting the organisms
within.14 As a direct result of their feeding behavior, shellfish
frequently absorb toxins, bacteria, disease causing
microorganisms (pathogens), metals, and other pollutants that
may be present in the water.15 Many factors influence the
success of shellfish populations, but due to the physical
characteristics of the species, water quality is paramount.16
Unfortunately, shallow coastal waterways, where shellfish
thrive, often serve as repositories for pollutants.17
Although there are many sources that lead to the
contamination of the shellfish population, CERCLA is best
designed to combat the problem of pollution specifically in
the form of releases18 of hazardous substances, pollutants or
contaminants that find their way into coastal waters. Rhode
Island’s experience with the Naval Construction Battalion
Center in North Kingstown is a prime example of CERCLA’s
applicability in recovering for a contaminated shellfish
source.
From 1939 until 2001, the Navy owned and operated a
landfill on several large parcels of property adjacent to Allan
Harbor in Narragansett Bay.19 The Navy disposed of
hazardous substances on the property, such as
methylmercury, which eventually seeped into the harbor and
accumulated in surrounding shellfish.20 The State of Rhode
13

Id.
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
CERCLA defines a "release" as "any spilling, leaking, pumping,
pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching,
dumping, or disposing into the environment . . . " 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22)
(2002).
19
Turn to 10, Navy Will Pay $1.4 Million For Environmental Damage
In R.I., (Jan. 12, 2006),
http://www.turnto10.com/news/6029697/detail.html?subid=10101342
(last visited May 31, 2006).
20
Id.
14
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Island indefinitely closed the area to harvesting shellfish in
1984. 21 The State of Rhode Island, acting in their capacity as
Natural Resource Trustee, brought a natural resource damage
action to recover for the lost use of the shellfish resource,
among other things.22 In a final settlement, the U.S. Navy
agreed to compensate the State of Rhode Island $1.4 million
for damages to natural resources.23
The availability of an uncontaminated shellfish resource
is imperative for three major reasons: (1) avoiding harmful
effects on human health; (2) avoiding economic harm; and,
(3) preserving the coastal eco-system.
A. Human Health Considerations
Perhaps the most compelling reason for addressing
shellfish contamination is eliminating the potential threat to
human health. Although shellfish contain considerable
nutritional value24 and have been consumed for centuries,25
disease and illness are constantly attributed to shellfish
consumption.26 Not surprisingly, the disease and illness
originate from unsanitary conditions that are sometimes
present in the water at shellfish harvesting areas.27
Generally, state and local governments are charged with
the responsibility of preventing the consumption of
contaminated shellfish.28 In the event of contamination, the
21

Id.
Id.
23
Id.
24
Institute of Medicine, supra note 4, at 1 (“[S]hellfish are nutritious
foods that constitute desirable components of a healthy diet.”).
25
Katherine Szabo, Prehistoric Shellfish Gathering,
http://www.manandmollusc.net/history_food.net. (Last visited Apr. 10,
2006).
26
J. David Clem, Historical Overview, Environmental Indicators and
Shellfish Safety 1, 1–29 (Cameron R. Hackney & Merle D. Pierson eds.,
1994).
27
Id.
28
Environmental Protection Agency, EPA’s Recommendations on the
Use of Fish and Shellfish Consumption Advisories (October 24, 2000),
www.epa.gov/waterscience/library//wqstandards/shellfish.pdf (last visited
22
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State’s Department of Health will issue consumption
advisories to the general population or close shellfish beds
entirely.29 Despite the government’s good faith attempts to
regulate shellfish consumption, a substantial portion of
shellfish is caught by recreational fisherman and may be
consumed absent any regulation.30 The availability of a
shellfish resource safe for consumption is contingent upon a
clean harvesting area.31
B. Economic Considerations
Native shellfish are responsible for providing
employment and fueling economic trade in certain coastal
regions; depletion in the availability of the resource affects
those who depend on the resource.32 Although coastal
regions in the United States do not currently rely on natural
resource industries the way they have in the past, the shellfish
industry maintains tremendous economic value.33 Moreover,
when one considers the residual effects of related industries,
such as boat and truck sales, retail sales, restaurants,

December 13, 2006); see also Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21
U.S.C. §§ 342(a)(1)-(7) (2005).
29
Environmental Protection Agency, supra note 28.
30
Institute of Medicine, supra note 4, at 2 (“One-fifth of the fish and
shellfish eaten in the United States is derived from recreational or
subsistence fishing, and these products are not subject to health-based
control; there is need to improve protection for consumers of these
products by regulation of harvest and by education concerning risks
associated with their consumption.”).
31
Dore supra note 12,at 17.
32
Dick White, Shellfisherman Will Feel Impact First, N. B. Std.
Times, April 30, 2003 at A1, at http://www.s-t.com/daily/04-03/04-3003/a01lo010.htm (Discussing the impact of an oil spill on local
shellfisherman).
33
EPA, State of the New England Environment, (1996),
http://www.epa.gov/NE/soe/coastal.html (last visited April 23, 2006)
(“The commercial shellfish harvest is worth about $200 million per year
to the region and represents a livelihood for thousands of people.”).
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wholesaling and packing and tourism, the total value of the
shellfish industry is incalculable.34
C. Ecological Considerations
Throughout history, man has held a misconception that
the ocean is a limitless resource, incapable of being damaged
by human hands.35 Passage of time and numerous scientific
studies have proved that human activity is directly
responsible for immeasurable damage to coastal waters.36
The ocean is a complex ecosystem where species are
intricately connected to one another; contamination of the
shellfish population has unknown ramifications on the plants
and other species that live within the same coastal ecosystem
and feed on the resource. Unfortunately, current laws and
policies tend to “emphasize use instead of protection and
preservation, individual resources instead of interconnected
ecosystems, problems of recent origin instead of historical
accumulations of human-induced marine degradation.”37
III. THE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
Success in a natural resource damage action involving
shellfish contamination case will hinge on highly
sophisticated technical scientific evidence, in conjunction
with the testimony of experts, specifically used in proving
causation and in quantifying damages.38 Environmental
34

Gregg R. Rivara, Water Quality and Shellfish on Long Island
(2002), http://www.nywea.org/
clearwaters/02-fall/waterqualityands.html (last visited June 6, 2006).
35
Robin Kundis Craig, Taking the Long View of Ocean Ecosystems:
Historical Science, Marine Restoration, and the Oceans Act of 2000, 29
ECOLOGY L.Q. 649, 651 (2002).
36
Id. at 652 (“[H]umans are degrading—sometimes even destroying—
large areas of the oceans and the biodiversity that they contain.”).
37
Id. at 651.
38
Keun J. Park, Judicial Utilization of Scientific Evidence in Complex
Environmental Torts: Redefining Litigation Driven Research, 7 FORDHAM
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litigation is “document intensive, involves a great deal of
discovery, expert witnesses, and often a huge amount of
technical data with their own concepts and language.”39
Accordingly, the environmental advocate must take full
advantage of the Federal Rules of Evidence and existing case
law to ensure that all of the relevant scientific evidence and
expert testimony has a chance to be presented at trial.
The introduction of scientific evidence at trial is a routine
practice during CERCLA litigation and, very often, it serves
as the most critical factor for determining liability.40 The
admissibility of scientific evidence stems from the standards
established in Frye v. United States,41 which requires that the
proponent of scientific evidence demonstrate that the
scientific theory and the method used to develop that theory
is “generally accepted within the relevant scientific
community.”42
In 1993, the Supreme Court departed from the venerable
Frye test when it decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.43 Daubert held that Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 is the new standard for determining the
admissibility of scientific evidence and it further established a
“gatekeeping” role for federal district courts that requires an
independent judicial assessment of reliability based on
several defined factors.44
ENVTL. L.J. 483, 491–92 (1996) (“For example, proving causation of
incurrence of response costs under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), is frequently
determinable only by reference to scientific opinion”).
39
Id. at 485.
40
Id.
41
293 F. 1013, at 1013–14 (C.A.D.C 1923).
42
State v. Garcia, 197 Ariz. 79, 3 P.3d 999, 1002 (1999) (“Under
Frye, the admissibility of novel scientific evidence depends on whether
the evidence sought to be introduced is derived from a scientific theory or
principle that has achieved general acceptance in the relevant scientific
community”).
43
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
44
Judith A. Hasko, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.:
Flexible Judicial Screening of Scientific Expert Evidence Under Federal
Rule of Evidence 702, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 479(1995) (When making its

151

Trends and Issues in Scientific Evidence

Vol. 1

In 1999, the Supreme Court decided Kumho Tire v.
Carmichael,45 which held that Daubert applies to all expert
testimony, not just scientific testimonial evidence.46
Furthermore, the court clarified that it is not necessary that all
of the factors mentioned in Daubert be present to make the
evidence admissible.47
As with any type of evidence introduced at trial, the
admissibility of scientific evidence turns on its relevancy.48
The burden is placed on the party that seeks to have the
evidence admitted to specify what issues it relates to and
show how it rationally advances the inquiry about that
issue.49 Ultimately, the trial court judge is responsible for
making the final determination of which evidence will be
admissible at trial.50
A natural resource damage action involving shellfish
contamination will involve highly technical information or
analysis that is most likely beyond the knowledge of the
typical juror and therefore, will require the testimony of an
expert. Despite its ability to influence a jury “because of its
aura of special reliability and trustworthiness,”51 expert

determination regarding the admission of scientific evidence, the court
will evaluate several factors: (1) whether the scientific theory or technique
has been empirically tested; (2) whether the scientific theory or technique
has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or
potential rate for error; (4) the expert’s qualifications and stature in the
scientific community; (5) whether the results can be replicated by other
experts elsewhere; and, (6) whether the technique and its results can be
explained with sufficient clarity so that the court and the jury can
understand its plain meaning).
45
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
46
Id. at 151–58.
47
Id.
48
Evidence is considered relevant when it has “any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 401.
49
Id.
50
FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
51
United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973).
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testimony synthesizes and explains the intricacies of the
evidence being presented at trial.
Unlike eyewitnesses or parties subject to litigation, expert
witnesses testify based on their own experience and
knowledge and are allowed to apply their expertise to the
facts of the case.52 A scientist holding an advanced academic
degree in a field that sufficiently relates to the issue in dispute
is usually qualified as an expert.53 Trial courts are given
broad discretion in making the final decision as to whether a
witness qualifies as an expert based on the “facts and
circumstances of the particular case.”54
The role of the scientific expert at trial differs completely
from his or her role in the scientific world. In the scientific
world, the scientist seeks to achieve certainty through
repetition. However, in the courtroom, the plaintiff does not
have the obligation to prove his case to a scientific
“certainty,” but rather, to a standard of a preponderance of the
evidence.55 Justice Blackmun noted this distinction in
Daubert:
52

Expert testimony is guided by the Federal Rules of Evidence 702.
The rule states: “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or
data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods,
and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the
facts of the case.” FED. R. EVID. 702.
53
Id.
54
Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1179 (1999) (“Rule 702
grants the district judge the discretionary authority, reviewable for its
abuse, to determine reliability in light of the particular facts and
circumstances of the particular case”).
55
Kimberly C. Harris, Use and Examination of Experts In
Environmental Litigation, 50 AM. JUR. Trials 471 §3. The role of expert
proof in environmental litigation (updated 2005). (“[E]nvironmental
litigation often involves an array of competing scientific ‘facts’ as to
which some ‘certainty’ is sought. Indeed, even scientific facts are not
certain, but only theories with high probabilities of validity. Scientific
experts typically speak not of certainty, but of probability. For that
reason, the resolution of many disputed environmental cases turns on the
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It is true that open debate is an essential part of
both legal and scientific analyses. Yet there
are important differences between the quest
for truth in the courtroom and the quest for
truth in the laboratory. Scientific conclusions
are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the
other hand, must resolve disputes finally and
quickly. The scientific project is advanced by
broad and wide-ranging consideration of a
multitude of hypotheses, for those that are
incorrect will eventually be shown to be so,
and that in itself is an advance. Conjectures
that are probably wrong are of little use,
however, in the project of reaching a quick,
final, and binding legal judgment—often of
great consequence—about a particular set of
events in the past.56
Furthermore, when determining whether a proffer of
scientific evidence is sufficiently reliable, it is important to
consider “whether the experts are proposing to testify about
matters growing naturally and directly out of research they
have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they
have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of
If the experts developed their opinions
testifying.”57
expressly for the purposes of testifying, then “proof that the
research and analysis supporting the proffered conclusions
have been subjected to normal scientific scrutiny through
peer review and publication” is required.58
Claims and litigation involving contamination of a
shellfish resource include the expertise of highly skilled
resolution of scientific or technical issues. Both tasks that a is not
prepared to handle without the assistance of experts”).
56
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 589, 596–97 (1993).
57
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir.
1995) (hereinafter “Daubert II”).
58
Id. at 1318.
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professionals such as biologists, chemists, civil engineers,
hydrologists, physicians and economists as both fact and
expert witnesses.
These experts have the difficult
responsibility of analyzing various scientific theories and
simplifying them for the comprehension of the jury. This
type of complex environmental litigation will frequently
involve complex scientific uncertainties that go beyond the
comprehension of the average juror.59 The prospect of
obtaining absolute scientific certainty at trial is unrealistic.
Rather, the jury is charged with the responsibility of
determining liability based on one of many potentially
credible scientific theories.60
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that
environmental litigation requires a special understanding of
the nature of scientific evidence:
Undoubtedly, certainty is the scientific ideal—
to the extent that even science can be certain
of its truth. But certainty in the complexities of
environmental medicine may be achievable
only after the fact, when scientists have the
opportunity for leisurely and isolated scrutiny
of an entire mechanism61

59

Susan E. Cowell, Pretrial Mediation of Complex Scientific Cases: A
Proposal to Reduce Jury and Judicial Confusion, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
981, 981–82 (2000).
60
Howard T. Markey, Jurisprudence or “Juriscience”?, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 525, 526–28 (1984); see also Scott C. Whitney, The Case
for Creating a Special Environmental Court System, 14 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 473, 477–82 (1973);Scott C. Whitney, The Case for Creating a
Special Environmental Court System– A Further Comment, 15 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 33, 45 (1973). (Parenthetical information is encouraged
after using “see also”).
61
Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 25
(D.C. Cir. 1976). Author combined the words of the judge with footnote
#52 of this case to get this quote, therefore it was cut out.
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IV. THE FRAMEWORK OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION,
AND LIABILITY ACT
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980, primarily as a means
of curing past pollution and preventing future pollution as a
result of discharges of hazardous substances.62 In addition to
compensating landowners and governments for the
remediation of contaminated sites, CERLCA authorizes
“natural resource trustees”63 to recover compensatory
“damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural
resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such
injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release.”64
In other words, the statute provides the natural resource
trustee with the ability to achieve two broad objectives: (1)
the cleanup of sites contaminated by hazardous waste and (2)
the ability to recover damages for the destruction of natural
resources.65

62

Peter M. Manus, Federalism Under Siege at the Rocky Mountain
Arsenal: Preemption and CERCLA After United States v. Colorado, 19
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 327, 352 (1994) (“According to its legislative
history, CERCLA was enacted ‘to establish a comprehensive response
and financing mechanism to abate and control the vast problems
associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites.’”
quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1016(I), 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) 22, reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N (94 Stat.). 6119, 6125).
63
Natural resource trustees are federal, state, or Indian tribe officials
designated to act on behalf of the public as trustees for natural resources.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (2000); see also Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v.
Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (“State governments may act in
their parens patriae capacity as representatives for all their citizens in a
suit to recover damages for injury to a sovereign interest”); Alaska Sport
Fishing Association v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1994) (“A
state has a sovereign interest in natural resources within its boundaries”).
64
42 U.S.C § 9607(a)(4)(C) (2000); see also Patrick T. Michael, III,
Natural Resource Damages Under CERCLA: The Emerging Champion of
Environmental Enforcement, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 185, 190 (1992).
65
Patrick T. Michael III, supra note 64, at 189.
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A. REMEDIATION ACTION
CERCLA’s primary purpose was to address pollution
situations involving sites that were formerly used for the
disposal of hazardous waste.66 The statute sets forth a
detailed remediation process for investigating the source of
pollution, identification of the responsible party, and
providing financial resources necessary to clean up the
polluted sites.67
Although this note focuses specifically on a CERCLA
action for natural resource damages, it is important to set
forth the process of a remediation action because the natural
resource trustee will be responsible for meeting the elements
of a remediation action before it can recover for natural
The plaintiff must establish the
resource damages.68
following four elements to impose liability under section 107
of CERCLA: (1) the defendant falls within one of the four
categories of “responsible parties”; (2) the hazardous
substances are disposed at a “facility”; (3) there is a “release”
or threatened release of hazardous substances from the
facility into the environment; and, (4) the release causes the
incurrence of “response costs.”69
The causation element that creates obstacles under
common law principles and in CERCLA natural resource
damage actions is less troublesome in remediation cases. In
Krygoski Construction Co., Inc. v. City of Menominee, the
court defined the modern view of the causation element in a
CERCLA remediation: “Although liability under CERCLA is
66

Dedham Water Co. Inc. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 972 F.2d
453 (1st Cir. 1992).
67
55 Fed. Reg. 6154–57 (Feb. 21, 1990).
68
Carol E. Dinkins & Kristie M. Tice, New Solutions For Old
Problems in Newark Bay, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 60, 65 (1998).
69
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000); see also United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258–59 (3rd Cir.1992); United States v.
Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1378–79 (8th Cir.1989),Blake
A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under The Remedial
Purpose Canon: Have The Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?,
20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 199, 279 (1996).
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strict, . . . a CERCLA plaintiff still shoulders the burden of
alleging and proving an unbroken chain of events occurred
which bridged his necessary response costs to the defendant’s
conduct.”70
Without a doubt, the use of scientific evidence plays an
integral role during a remediation action under CERCLA.
“The ‘expert's opinion as to fate and transport of chemicals
in the soil and groundwater may be the sole means of
interpreting evidence at trial, and the use of medical and
toxicological experts the principle means of attempting to
bring rationality to the issue of 'how clean is clean’."'71 The
scientific tests and analysis performed through the
remediation process “play an integral role in the evaluation of
site conditions.”72
B. NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ACTION
CERCLA also provides a method for the natural resource
trustee to recover for “injury to, destruction of, or loss of
natural resources . . .” on behalf of the public.73 Clearly, a
natural resource damage action is the logical method for
recovery after contamination of the shellfish resource caused
70

431 F. Supp.2d 755, 763 (W.D. Mich. 2006) (quoting Rhodes v.
County of Darlington, South Carolina, 833 F. Supp. 1163, 1190 (D.S.C.
1992)); see also Dedham Water Co. Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, at 1152
(Liability for response costs under CERCLA section 107 requires only a
minimal connection).
71
Park, supra note 38, at 492 (quoting Steven P. McDonald & Jon K.
Wactor, Practicing in the Brave New World of Scientific Litigation Post
Daubert v. Merrell Dow, RECORDER, Oct. 5, 1994, at 10).
72
Id.
73
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (2000); see generally Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t
of Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also 42 U.S.C § 9601(16)
(2000) (A natural resource is defined by CERCLA as: “[L]and, fish,
wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and
other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by,
appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the United States…any State
or local government, any foreign government, any Indian tribe, or, if such
resources are subject to a trust restriction on alienation, any member of an
Indian tribe.”)
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by a release of a hazardous substance. “A natural resource
damage action essentially is a tort action . . .” brought by the
government on behalf of the general public.74 The elements
for establishing a prima facie case in natural resource damage
action is discussed in the next section.
V. UTILIZING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE TO MAKE A
PRIMA FACIE CASE IN A NATURAL RESOURCE
DAMAGE LAWSUIT
The first step in the natural resource damage recovery
process is establishing “baseline.” Baseline is defined as "the
condition or conditions that would have existed at the
assessment area had the discharge of oil or release of
hazardous substance under investigation not occurred".75
Next, the natural resource trustee is responsible for
establishing the “causal link” between the release of the
hazardous substance and the injury to the natural resource.76
Unfortunately, the standard for determining the causal link in
natural resource damage actions has been subject to many
interpretations.77 Despite its appearance as a strict liability
standard for causation, the few courts that have addressed the
causation issue in a natural resource damage case have
determined that the plaintiff is required to at least make a
minimal showing of proximate causation.78
To meet that causation standard, the plaintiff is charged
with fingerprinting the sources of pollution or the cause of
injury to a shellfish resource. This is a task that involves
scientific research performed over the course of years.
Detecting pollutants in the ocean and determining the
74

See Dinkins & Tice, supra note 68, at 65.
43 C.F.R. § 11.14(e) (2005).
76
See Dinkins & Tice, supra note 68, at 65.
77
See Mendel, supra note 5, at 101–04.
78
Id.; see also Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432,
470 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("There is little evidence, however, that Congress
specifically intended to ease the standard of proof for showing that a
particular spill caused a particular biological injury.").
75

159

Trends and Issues in Scientific Evidence

Vol. 1

pathway those pollutants took to arrive at their final
destination can be daunting.79
Because shellfish
contamination rarely occurs on the actual site in which there
was a release of hazardous substances, the Natural Resource
Trustee has the added difficulty of holding the owners of
adjacent sites liable for the damages.
Proving that specific pollutants were the proximate cause
of injury presents even more difficulties.
The time
restrictions, the nature of litigation and making a final
determination of causation can easily be disputed. Because
the scientific expert’s ultimate determination will conclude
only after the analysis of technical scientific data and
theories, the credibility of the experts who testify at trial
becomes an issue on which the litigation will turn, creating a
so called “battle of the experts.”80
Recently, the 9th circuit Federal Court of Appeals had
reason to closely examine the nature of microbiologist expert
testimony in shellfish contamination litigation when it
decided Clausen v. M/V New Carissa.81 Although the case
does not deal specifically with scientific evidence in regard to
a CERCLA natural resource damage action, it provides
valuable insight into the battle of the experts and the nebulous
nature of proving causation in a natural resource damage case
specifically involving shellfish.82
79

Clifford Fisher, The Role of Causation in Science as Law and
Proposed Changes in the Current Common Law Toxic Tort System, 9
BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 35, 60 (2001) (“In nearly every tort action, the plaintiff
must prove causation. Causation involves a two-step analysis. The first
step is factual causation and the second is proximate causation. Factual
causation is used to determine whether there is a connection between the
allegedly tortuous conduct and the plaintiff's injury. This cause-effect
relationship is the part of environmental law that is difficult for the victim
to prove”).
80
Richard B. Racine, Jeffrey A. Lindeman & Katherine B. Davis, The
Battle Over Science in the Courtroom, 42-FEB FED. LAW. 36 (1995).
81
339 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2003).
82
Gerald F. George, Litigation of Claims For Natural Resource
Damages, SD88 ALI-ABA 631, 633 (1999) (“Federal statutory authority
for recovery of natural resource damages has existed since the 1977
amendments to the Clean Water Act and the passage of CERCLA in
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In Clausen, a vessel carrying 400,000 gallons of bunker
and diesel fuel spilled approximately 70,000 gallons of oil
into Coos Bay, Oregon, the richest oyster growing area in
Oregon.83 A report prepared by federal and state agencies
concluded that the oil from the vessel was responsible for the
death of approximately 3.5 million oysters.84 Accordingly,
the owners and operators of a commercial oyster farm
“brought suit against the New Carissa and its corporate
owners and operators in federal district court, alleging claims
under the Federal Oil Pollution Act85 and the Oregon Oil
Spill Act.”86
To establish the requisite causation, the oyster farmers
offered testimony from a marine biologist.87 It was the
opinion of the plaintiff’s marine biologist that the oil caused
the oysters to develop lesions, which became infected, and
ultimately caused their death.88 The defendants countered the
plaintiff’s argument with testimony from their own marine
biologist who also determined that the oysters, in fact, had
developed lesions.89 However, it was the defendant’s opinion
that the lesions were caused by low salinity in bay due to
heavy rainfalls.90
Both experts reached their conclusions after examining
the same six potential causes for the lesions in oysters: “(1)
infectious disease; (2) freezing trauma; (3) acute toxic effects
of non-oil contaminants; (4) acute toxic effects of oil; (5) low
salinity; and (6) low-level toxic effects of oil.”91 Both experts
were able to definitively “rule out” causes one through four
1980. However, despite the increasing number of claims, there is still
limited case law on most issues, and almost no cases have been fully
litigated”).
83
Clausen, 339 F.3d at 1051–52.
84
Id. at 1152.
85
Federal Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (1990).
86
OR. REV. STAT. § 468B.300 (2005); see Clausen, 339 F.3d at 1052.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 1053.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
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“as the ultimate cause of the oyster deaths.”92 Predictably, the
plaintiff’s expert determined that the low-level toxic effects
of oil were responsible for the lesions on the oysters and the
defendant’s expert was of the opinion that low levels of
salinity in the water caused the lesions.93
Prior to trial, the defendant’s moved to exclude the
proffered testimony of the plaintiff’s marine biologist on the
grounds that it was not sufficient under the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Daubert.94 The court denied the motion to exclude
and the plaintiff’s expert witness was able to testify at trial.95
On appeal, the court rejected the defendant’s complaint that
the plaintiff’s expert lacked sufficient scientific basis to "rule
in" contact toxicity and that the admission of such expert
testimony constitutes an abuse of discretion.96
A. CALCULATING NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES
Finally, the natural resource trustee is responsible for
proving damages to and placing a value on the natural
resource.97 One of the most contentious issues involving
expert testimony in environmental litigation is the
quantification and valuation of damages to the natural
resources destroyed by pollution.
Natural resource
“[d]amages are measured by the services these assets provide
and how an alteration in their condition impairs the ability of
the natural assets to continue to provide these services.”98 To
make these important determinations, experts will refer to the
Natural Resource Damage Assessment (“NRDA”)
92

Id.
Id.
94
Id. at 1055; see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 509 U.S. 579
(1993).
95
Clausen, 339 F.3d at 1055.
96
Id. at 1059 (“The ship owners’ primary argument on appeal . . . [is]
that [the expert’s] use of methodology was unreliable because he should
never have ruled in low-level toxic effects of oil as a potential cause of
the oyster mortality.”).
97
Daubert, 509 U.S. 579.
98
See Lowell, supra note 2, at 176.
93
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regulations promulgated by the Department of the Interior,
which “provide a framework to calculate compensatory
monetary damages necessary to restore the natural resources
to their “baseline” condition, and a methodology for
calculating resource services lost to the public.”99
During the valuation process, economists attempt to place
a value on the natural resources by evaluating two criteria:
“the choice being made to consume or use the service,” and
“public exclusion, appropriation, or regulation over the
natural resource.”100
When a coastal waterway is
contaminated with pollution and the shellfish resource is
destroyed or off limits to fishing for a period of time, the
value of the shellfish is quantified “by lost profits determined
by directly observable market behavior.”101
Assessing the damage to the natural resource can cause
confusion. Section 301(c)(2) of CERCLA calls for the natural
resource damage assessment regulations in the following
terms:
Such regulations should specify: (A) standard
procedures for simplified assessments
requiring minimal field observation, including
establishing measures of damages based on
units of discharge or release or units of
affected area, and (B) alternative protocols for
conducting assessments in individual cases to
determine the type and extent of short and
long-term injury, destruction, or loss. Such
regulations shall identify the best available
procedures to determine such damages,
including both direct and indirect injury,
99

42 U.S.C. § 9651(c) (2000). Shannon Kaster, Natural Resource
Damage Assessments, 15 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 114, 115 (2000).
100
See Lowell, supra note 2, at 176–77 (quoting Raymond J. Kopp &
V. Kerry Smith, Understanding Damages to Natural Assets, In VALUING
NATURAL ASSETS: The Economics Of Natural Resource Damage
Assessment 6, 1013 (Raymond J. Kopp & V. Kerry Smith eds., 1993)).
101
Id. at 177.
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destruction, or loss and shall take into
consideration factors, including, but not
limited to, replacement value, and ability of
the ecosystem or resource to recover.102
These regulations have been classified as “Type A” and
“Type B” procedures.103 Both procedures consist of three
steps in assessing damage: an Injury Determination phase, a
Quantification phase, and a Damage Determination phase.104
During the Injury Determination phase, the assessment
focuses on determining that an injury to the resource has
occurred and that the injury has resulted from the discharge
or release.105 After the injury is confirmed, the assessment
moves into the Quantification phase.106 The focus is
identifying the services provided by the resource, determining
the baseline level of such services, and quantifying the
reduction in services resulting from the discharge or
release.107 In the damage determination phase, where focus is
on economic valuation or costing techniques, the monetary
compensation for injury is calculated, based on either the
restoration or replacement costs or the loss in use value of the
resources.108 The use value of a natural resource is nothing
more than the economic value of the resource to the people
who utilize them.109
Beyond having economic value, natural resources are
recognized as possessing a certain intrinsic value, which
102

CERCLA Chapter 301(c)(2). I believe that it would be cited as: 42
U.S.C § 9651(c)(2) (2005).
103
Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L.
REV. 269, 275 (1989).
104
J. Terrance Ryan, The Evolution of Natural Resource Damage
Assessments Under the Oil Pollution Act and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 6 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L.J. 29, 35–42 (1994).
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 281.
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cannot be quantified by performing an economic analysis.110
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged the abstract
exercise of placing a monetary value on natural resources:
While it is not irrational to look at market
price as one factor in determining the use
value of a resource, it is unreasonable to view
market price as the exclusive factor, or even
the predominant one. From the bald eagle to
the blue whale and snail darter, natural
resources have values that are not fully
captured by the market system.111
It is widely believed that placing an economic value on
natural resources using NRDA regulations “allows courts to
assess damages for environmental harm, deters future
pollution, and helps ensure protection for natural
ecosystems.”112 On the other hand, some legal commentators
have been critical of natural resource damages for having
unreliable standards for assessing values, placing too much
weight to the speculation of economists and placing an undue
burden on business and industry.113
110

See Lowell, supra note 2, at 177–78 (“For example, phytoplankton
in and of themselves are surely not worth much in their individual
capacity, but when one considers that phytoplankton serve as the base of
the food chain on which all marine life thrives and requires for its very
existence, their worth may be invaluable”); see Cross, supra note 104, at
292–93.
111
State of Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 462–63 (D.C.
Cir. 1989).
112
See Cross, supra note 104, at 270.
113
See Anderson, supra note 5, at 486–87. (“Both the DOI and NOAA
regulations clearly give government trustees broad discretion to assess
natural resource damages using a wide range of methods, some of which
may not withstand scientific scrutiny.”); see also Richard B. Stewart,
Natural Resource Damages: The New Wave of Environmental Liability,
THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY 1998, http://www.fedsoc.org/Publications/practicegroupnewsletters/environmentallaw/el02010
1.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2005) (“Trustees are now mobilizing to assert
ambitious NRD claims, threatening U.S. businesses and insurers and
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VI. CONCLUSION
It is indisputable that shellfish contamination creates a
negative impact on the economy, poses a serious risk to
human health, and has a harmful effect on the fragile coastal
ecosystems. However, the litigation designed to redress the
harmful effects of shellfish contamination produces
uncounted difficulties. Although a general public policy of
preventing pollution has led Congress to enact and revise
CERCLA, the application of such a statute has proven to be
uncertain due to the enormous amount of discretion given to
the trial courts in deciding admissibility of scientific evidence
and testimony of experts.
A CERCLA natural resource damage action designed to
remedy shellfish contamination is the ultimate example of the
awkward partnership of law and science, requiring a fact
finder to base a legal conclusion on scientific uncertainties.
Unfortunately, a causation standard that requires the natural
resource trustee to provide a causal connection between the
release and the injuries to natural resources, instead of the
strict liability standard used in remediation actions, hinders
the ultimate objective of returning a clean environment to the
public.

federal agencies…with potentially enormous liabilities and massive
transaction costs that go far beyond those recognized in any other country.
Unless prompt steps are taken to reform the NRD programs, they will spin
out of control”).

